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A cognitively autonomous artificial agent may be defined as one able to modify both its 
external world-model and the framework by which it represents the world, requiring two 
simultaneous optimization objectives. This presents deep epistemological issues cen-
tered on the question of how a framework for representation (as opposed to the entities 
it represents) may be objectively validated. In this article, formalizing previous work in 
this field, it is argued that subsumptive perception-action learning has the capacity to 
resolve these issues by (a) building the perceptual hierarchy from the bottom up so as 
to ground all proposed representations and (b) maintaining a bijective coupling between 
proposed percepts and projected action possibilities to ensure empirical falsifiability of 
these grounded representations. In doing so, we will show that such subsumptive per-
ception-action learners intrinsically incorporate a model for how intentionality emerges 
from randomized exploratory activity in the form of “motor babbling.” Moreover, such 
a model of intentionality also naturally translates into a model for human–computer 
interfacing that makes minimal assumptions as to cognitive states.
Keywords: perception-action learning, intention recognition, embodied cognition, subsumption hierarchies, 
symbol grounding
1. iNtrODUctiON
Significant deficits have been apparent in traditional approaches to embodied computer vision for 
some time (Dreyfus, 1972). In the conventional approach to autonomous robotics, a computer vision 
system is employed to build a model of the agent’s environment prior to the act of planning the agent’s 
actions within the modeled domain. Visuo-haptic data arising from these actions will then typically 
be used to further constrain the environment model, either actively or passively (in active learning 
the agent actions are driven by the imperative of reducing ambiguity in the environment model 
(Koltchinskii, 2010; Settles, 2010)).
However, it is apparent, in this approach, that there exists a very wide disparity between the 
visual parameterization of the agent’s domain and its action capabilities within it (Nehaniv et al., 
2002). For instance, the agent’s visual parametric freedom will typically encompass the full inten-
sity ranges of the RGB channels of each individual pixel of a camera CCD, such that the range 
of possible images generated per time-frame is of an extremely large order of magnitude, despite 
the fact that only a minuscule fraction of this representational space would ever be experienced 
by the agent. (Note that this observation is not limited purely to vision-based approaches— 
alternative modalities such as LIDAR and SONAR would also exhibit the same issues.) On the 
other hand, the agent’s motor capability is likely to be very much more parametrically constrained 
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(perhaps consisting of the possible Euler angle settings of the 
various actuator motors). This disparity is manifested in clas-
sical problems such as framing (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969) 
and symbol grounding. (The latter occurs when abstractly 
manipulated symbolic objects lack an intrinsic connection to 
the real-world objects that they represent; thus a chess-playing 
robot typically requires a prior supervised computer vision 
problem to be solved in order to apply deduced moves to visu-
ally presented chess pieces.)
Perception-Action (P-A) learning was proposed in order to 
overcome these issues, adopting as its informal motto, “action 
precedes perception” (Granlund, 2003; Felsberg et  al., 2009). 
By this it is meant that, in a fully formalizable sense, actions are 
conceptually prior to perceptions; i.e., perceptual capabilities 
should depend on action-capabilities and not vice versa. (We thus 
distinguish PA-learning from more generalized forms of learning 
within a perception/action context (cf., e.g., (Mai et  al., 2013; 
Masuta et  al., 2015; Millan, 2016)), in which the nature of the 
perceptual domain remains fixed a priori [albeit with potential 
variations in, e.g., visual saliency].)
It will be the argument of this article that perception-action 
learning, as well as having this capacity to resolve fundamental 
epistemic questions about emergent representational capacity, 
also naturally gives a model for emergent intentionality that 
applies to both human and artificial agents, and may thus be 
deployed as an effective design-strategy in human–computer 
interfacing.
2. PercePtiON-ActiON LeArNiNG
Perception-Action learning agents thus proceed by randomly 
sampling their action space (“motor babbling”). For each motor 
action that produces a discernible perceptual output in the boot-
strap representation space S (consisting of, e.g., camera pixels), a 
percept pi ∈ S is greedily allocated. The agent thus progressively 
arrives at a set of novel percepts that relate directly to the agent’s 
action capabilities in relation to the constraints of the environ-
ment (i.e., the environment’s affordances); the agent learns to 
perceive only that which it can change. More accurately, the 
agent learns to perceive only that which it hypothesizes that it can 
change—thus, the set of experimental data points ∪ipi ⊂ S can, in 
theory, be generalized over so as to create an affordance-manifold 
that can be mapped onto the action space via the injective relation 
{actions} →  {perceptinitial} ×  {perceptfinal} (Windridge and Kittler, 
2008, 2010; Windridge et al., 2013a).
2.1. subsumptive Perception-Action 
Learning
Importantly, this approach permits Cognitive Bootstrapping 
(Windridge and Kittler, 2010), the bootstrapping of an autono-
mous agent’s representational framework simultaneously with 
the world-model represented in terms of that framework. This 
centers on the fact that the learned manifold embodying the 
injective relation {actions} → {perceptinitial} × {perceptfinal} represents 
a constrained subset of the initial action domain, and as such, is 
susceptible to parametric compression. Furthermore, this para-
metric compression in the action domain (corresponding to the 
bootstrapping of a higher level action) necessarily corresponds to 
a parametric compression in the perceptual domain (P-A learning 
enforces a bijective relation { } { } { }initial
new
final
newactions percept percept↔ ×  
such that each hypothesizable action (i.e., intention primitive) 
has a unique, discriminable outcome (Windridge and Kittler, 
2008, 2010; Windridge et al., 2013a)).
Each induced higher level action/intention (e.g., Translate) 
is thus created coextantly with a higher level percept domain 
(e.g., Object). The falsifiability of such induced representational 
concepts arises from actively addressing the question of whether 
this higher level perception in fact constitutes a useful descrip-
tion of the world, i.e., whether it yields a net compression in the 
agent’s internal representation of its own possible interactions 
with the world (its affordances). In particular, it is argued in 
Windridge and Kittler (2008), that the perception-action bijectiv-
ity constraint applied in such a hierarchical manner is uniquely 
sufficient to enable simultaneous empirical falsifiability of the 
cognitive agent’s world model and the means by which this world 
is perceived (by virtue of the implicit grounding of the unique set 
of higher level percepts so generated).
Very often parametric compressibility will be predicated on 
the discovery of invariances in the existing perceptual space with 
respect to randomized exploratory actions. Thus, for example, 
an agent might progress from a pixel-based representation of the 
world to an object-based representation of the world via the dis-
covery that certain patches of pixels retain their (relative) identity 
under translation, i.e., such that it becomes far more efficient to 
represent the world in terms of indexed objects rather than pixel 
intensities (though the latter would, of course, still constitute the 
base of the representational hierarchy). This particular represen-
tational enhancement can represent an enormous compression 
(Wolff, 1987); a pixel-based representation has a parametric 
magnitude of Pn (with P and n being the intensity resolution and 
number of pixels, respectively), while an object-based representa-
tion typically has a parametric magnitude of ~ no, o ≪ n, where o 
is the number of objects.
When such a high level perceptual manifold is created it 
permits proactive sampling—the agent can propose actions 
with perceptual outcomes that have not yet been experienced 
by the agent, but which are consistent with its current repre-
sentational model (this guarantees falsifiability of both the 
perceptual model as well as the generalized affordance model). 
Perception-Action learning thus constitutes a form of active 
learning: randomized selection of perceptual goals within the 
hypothesized perception-action manifold leads more rapidly 
to the capture of data that might falsify the current hypothesis 
than would otherwise be the case (i.e., if the agent were per-
forming randomly selected actions within the original motor 
domain). Thus, while the system is always “motor babbling” in 
a manner analogous to the learning process of infant humans, 
the fact of carrying out this motor babbling in a higher level 
P-A manifold means that the learning system as a whole more 
rapidly converges on the “correct" model of the world. (Correct 
in the sense of being a true model of the world’s affordances; 
i.e., every possible instantiation of the induced high-level 
actions terminates in the anticipated percept, with no possible 
environmental actions being overlooked.)
ALGOritHm 1 | Ab Initio Induction of Perception-Action Hierarchy in Artificial 
Agents.
1: initialization Obtain:
2: Bootstrap percept set {P1} (eg camera pixel)
3: Bootstrap action set {A1} (motor primitives)
4: Inference mechanism capable of generalizing exploratory samples from 
function M
M P P A achieved not_achievedn n: × × → ,{ } { } { } { }
initial final
5: while prediction accuracy < threshold) do
6:   A) carry-out randomized exploratory activity on basis of 
representational-framework
  i.e. generate grounded top-down parametric instantiations
  Ai≤n(Pinitial, Pfinal) by randomly selecting initial &
  target percepts at proposed top level of hierarchy, n
7:   B) induce rules governing action legitimacy
  legitimate actions achieve intended perceptual goal
  (= affordance-based model of world)
  Generate function M: {P} × {P} × {A} → {true, false}
  (e.g. via first-order logical induction or stochastic discrimination)
8:   c) remap perceptual variables to represent novel high-level 
action hypothesis in most efficient manner
  i.e. form the bijection: {An+1} ↔ {Pn+1} × {Pn+1}
9: end while
3
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This P-A motor-babbling activity can take place in any P-A 
manifold, of whatever level of abstraction; we may thus, by 
combining the idea of P-A learning with Brooke’s notion of task 
subsumption, conceive of a hierarchical perception-action learner 
(Shevchenko et al., 2009), in which a vertical representation hier-
archy is progressively constructed for which randomized explora-
tory motor activity at the highest level of the corresponding motor 
hierarchy would rapidly converge on an ideal representation of 
the agent’s world in terms of its affordance potentialities. Such a 
system would thus converge upon both a model of the world, and 
an ideal strategy for representation of that world in terms of the 
learning agent’s action capabilities within it. In the example given, 
which juxtaposes a simulated camera-equipped robot arm in 
relation to a child’s shape-shorter puzzle, the robotic agent com-
mences by motor babbling in the initial motor-actuator domain, 
and eventually progresses to motor-babbling in the bootstrapped 
“move-shape-to-hole” action domain (i.e., placing a randomly 
chosen object into its corresponding hole). This apparently inten-
tional activity amounts to solving the shape-sorter puzzle, even 
though the system is still only motor babbling albeit at a higher 
level of the induced hierarchy, and has no prior programming as 
to the “goal” of the environment.1
Procedurally, this takes place as a recursive loop alternating 
between exploration, generalization, and representation as in 
Algorithm  1. Note in particular, in Algorithm  1, that the act 
of parametrically instantiating a proposed bijective perception-
action term { } { }initial finalP Pn n×  with respect to an initial perceptual 
state { }Pn
initial  and a sought perceptual end-state { }finalPn is equivalent 
to formulating an intention (which may or may not be achievable 
in the environment).
Perceptual goals thus exist at all levels of the hierarchy, and 
the subsumptive nature of the hierarchy means that goals and 
sub-goals are scheduled with increasingly specific content as the 
high-level abstract goal is progressively grounded through the 
hierarchy.2 (Thus, as humans, we may conceive the high-level 
intention “drive to work,” which in order to be enacted, involves 
the execution of a large range of sub-goals with correspondingly 
lower level perceptual goals, e.g., the intention “stay in the center 
of the lane,” etc.) (The hierarchical perception-action paradigm 
at no stage specifies how the scheduled sub-task is to achieve 
the perceptual goal—this is free within the framework, and may 
be achieved by a variety of mechanisms, e.g., optimal control, 
minimum jerk, etc.)
1 In this case, the “move-shape-to-hole” action is induced following the failure 
of the “move-shape-onto-surface” action to produce the anticipated result 
(i.e., when, following exploratory “move-shape-onto-surface” actions, the object 
happens by chance to fall into a hole to which matches its shape and orientation). 
This immediately falsifies the existing rule-base such that that the action domain 
is necessarily modified, by first-order logical rule-induction, to account for this 
possibility. In the context of the PA bijectivity condition this requires the existence 
of an action “move-shape-to-hole” perceptually parameterized by a set of labels 
corresponding to the perceptual representation of holes. Exploratory instantiation 
of this higher-level rule then corresponds to placing random objects into their 
corresponding holes, i.e., “solving the shapesorter,” even though no such external 
goal specification has taken place.
2 The subsumption hierarchy thus acts bidirectionally; the hierarchy is learned 
bottom-up, while exploratory actions are instantiated top-down.
Moreover, these perceptual goals have no internal content; in 
a fully achieved perception-action learning agent, the environ-
ment effectively “becomes it own representation” (Newell and 
Simon, 1972), representing a significant compression of the 
information that an agent needs to retain. This relates directly 
to the issue of symbol grounding, a seminal problem in the 
conceptual underpinning of the classical approach to machine 
learning (Harnad, 1990). The problem arises when one attempts 
to relate an abstract symbol manipulation system (it was a 
common historical assumption that computational reasoning 
would center on a system such as first-order logic deduction 
(McCarthy and Hayes, 1969)) with the stochastic, shifting real-
ity of sensor data. In hierarchical P-A learning the problem is 
eliminated by virtue of the fact that symbolic representations are 
abstracted from the bottom-up (Marr, 1982; Gärdenfors, 1994; 
Granlund, 2003; Modayil and Kuipers, 2004). They are thus 
always intrinsically grounded (for an example of utilization of 
first-order logic induction within a subsumption hierarchy see 
Windridge and Kittler (2010)).
The subsumption hierarchy is thus typically characterized 
by continuous stochastic relationships on the lower levels with 
more discrete, symbolic manipulations occurring at the higher 
levels—for this reason, consistent with findings of Shevchenko 
et  al. (2009), motor-babbling at the top of the representation 
hierarchy involves the spontaneous scheduling of perceptual 
goals and subgoals at the lower level of the hierarchy in a way that 
(as the hierarchy becomes progressively deeper) looks increas-
ingly intentional. (This phenomenon is readily apparent in the 
development of motor movement of human infants as schema 
abstraction takes place—for instance, the intuition of a general-
ized percept category container correlates with the attempt to 
validate this notion via the repeated placing of a variety of objects 
into a variety of containers; cf., Hintzman (1986) for an analysis 
of scheme abstraction in infants.)
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Such high-level schema-employment in humans can, in 
principle, be detected via an appropriate classification system, 
enabling novel forms of intentional interfacing between humans 
and machines.
3. HUmAN–cOmPUter iNterFAciNG
The percept-action relationship may thus be modeled in reverse 
to characterize human intentional behavior; consider how, as 
humans we typically represent our environment when driving a 
vehicle. At one level, we internally represent the immediate envi-
ronment in metric-related terms (i.e., we are concerned with our 
proximity to other road users, to the curb and so on). At a higher 
level, however, we are concerned primarily with navigation-
related entities (i.e., how individual roads are connected). That the 
latter constitutes a higher hierarchical level, both mathematically 
and experientially, is guaranteed by the fact that the topological 
representation subsumes, or supervenes upon, the metric repre-
sentation; i.e., the metric-level provides additional “fine-grained” 
information to the road topology: the metric representation can 
be reduced to the topological representation, but not vice versa.
We can thus adopt the perception-action bijectivity principle 
as a design paradigm in building HCI systems by demanding that 
intentional acts on the part of the user are correlated maximally 
efficiently (i.e., bijectively) with perceptual transitions apparent to 
the user. This thus permits a user interface that makes minimal 
assumptions as to underlying cognitive processes, assuming 
nothing more than the ability to discriminate percept termina. 
This subsumption architecture paradigm was used in Windridge 
et al. (2013b) to demonstrate, in the context of a driver assistance 
system, induction of the intentional hierarchy for drivers of 
a vehicle in which action and eye-gaze take place with respect 
an external road camera view. The corresponding system con-
structed for the project demonstrator was thus able to determine 
the driver’s intentional hierarchy in relation to the current road 
situation and provide assistance accordingly. In principle, such 
an interface can also be extended to direct mechanical assistance 
by substituting the computationally modeled perception-action 
system for the human perception-action system along the lines 
of the horse–rider interaction paradigm.
Such P-A HCI interfaces will generally require the ability 
to adaptively link high-level reasoning processes (modeled by, 
e.g., first-order logic) with low-level reactive processes (modeled, 
for example, stochastically). This amounts to a requirement to 
propagate learning across the symbolic/sub-symbolic divide. 
However, because the P-A hierarchy does not make intrinsic dis-
tinction between these (there is only progressively grounded P-A 
abstraction), it is possible to conceive of P-A learning platforms 
that embody a variety of different learning approaches at different 
hierarchical levels, but which are all able to learn together by pass-
ing derivatives between hierarchical layers in a manner analogous 
to deep learning approaches.
An example utilizing a two-layer P-A hierarchy is given in 
Windridge et al. (2013a) which incorporates a fuzzy first-order 
logic reasoning process on the top level and an Euler-Lagrange-
based trajectory optmization process on the lower level. 
The fuzzy-reasoning process employs predicates embodying the 
P-A bijectivity condition to compute the fixed point of the logical 
operator TP; i.e., TP(I) = I for each time interval t.
I is thus the Herbrand model, the minimal logically consistent 
“world model” for time t, of the logical programme P (where 
P = fixed clauses + temporalized detections + ground atom queries 
for t + 1; P hence embodies a series of first-order logical rules 
concerning traffic behavior). This functionalization of the logical 
reasoning enables the predicate-prediction disparity with respect 
to the lower level to modulate the lower level’s Euler-Lagrange 
optimization via the interlevel Jacobean derivatives. The net result 
is logically weighted updating of the Euler-Lagrange optimization 
that allows for on-line (top-down and bottom-up) adaptivity to 
human inputs. For example, in top-down terms, this allows a logi-
cally influenced Bayesian prior for gaze-location at junctions to be 
derived. It also allows for adaptive symbol tethering; for example 
actively associating eye-gaze clusters with specific semantically 
described road entities (such as stop and give-way signs) via their 
logical context.
In principle, any high-level abstract reasoning or induction 
process can be incorporated with low-level stochastic learning in 
this manner; highly flexible human–computer interfaces are thus 
made possible through adopting perception-action bijectivity as 
a design principle.
4. cONcLUsiON
We have proposed perception-action hierarchies as a natural 
solution to the problem of representational induction in artifi-
cial agents in a manner that maintains empirical validatability. 
In such ab initio P-A hierarchies (i.e., where cognitive representa-
tions are bootstrapped in a bottom-up fashion), exploration is 
conducted via motor-babbling at progressively higher levels of 
the hierarchy. This necessarily involves the spontaneous schedul-
ing of perceptual goals and subgoals in the induced lower levels 
of the hierarchy in such a way that, as the hierarchy becomes 
deeper, that the randomized exploration becomes increasingly 
“intentional” (a phenomenon that is readily apparent in the 
development of motor movement in human infants).
This has implications for social robotics; in particular, it 
becomes possible to envisage communicable actions within 
collections of agents employing P-A hierarchies. Here, the same 
bijectivity considerations apply to perceptions and actions as 
before, however, the induction and grounding of symbols would 
be conducted through linguistic exchange (we note in passing that 
the perception-action bijectivity constraint implicitly embodies 
the notion of mirroring without requiring specific perceptual 
apparata—“mirror neurons,” etc.).
P-A subsumption hierarchies naturally also encompass 
symbolic/subsymbolic integration and permit adaptive learning 
with respect to existing knowledge bases; in this case a bijective 
P-A consistency criterion is imposed on the engineered subsump-
tion hierarchy. Moreover, P-A-subsumption hierarchies naturally 
lend themselves to a “deep” formulation in neural-symbolic terms 
(d’Avila Garcez et al., 2009); this is the subject of ongoing research.
We therefore conclude that perception-action learning, as 
well as enabling autonomous cognitive bootstrapping architec-
tures, also constitutes a particularly straightforward approach to 
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modeling human intentionality, in that it makes fewest cognitive 
assumptions—the existence of perceptual representation is only 
assumed in so far as it directly relates to an observable high-level 
action concept (such a “navigating a junction,” “stopping at a red 
light,” etc.); conversely, the ability to correctly interpret a human 
agent’s action implicitly invokes a necessary and sufficient set of 
perceptual representations on the part of the agent. This bijectiv-
ity of perception and action also gives a natural explanation for 
wider intention-related phenomenon such as action mirroring.
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